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OPINION OF THE COURT 
__________________ 
 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
 The brief on behalf of Petitioner-Appellant Han Tak 
Lee has listed the following statement of issues: 
 
1.  Is petitioner-appellant Han Tak Lee 
incarcerated for a crime of which newly discovered 
scientific evidence persuasively shows he is probably 
innocent, in violation of his due process rights? 
 
                a.  Is an actual innocence claim based upon 
newly discovered evidence cognizable in a federal 
habeas corpus petition filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254? 
 
      b.  Does AEDPA’a deferential standard of 
review apply to the Pennsylvania Superior court’s 
decision in this case? 
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2.  Is petitioner-appellant Lee entitled at least to 
discovery and an evidentiary hearing? 
 
Appellant’s Br. at 2.   
 
 Because we dispose of this matter on the final issue 
listed, we will not reach the other provocative issues in Nos. 1 
and 1a above. 
 
 Petitioner Han Tak Lee appeals from the District 
Court’s Order, which denied his petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 without granting 
discovery or conducting an evidentiary hearing.1
 
  Lee had 
been charged with first degree murder and arson after his 
twenty-year-old mentally ill daughter died in a cabin fire at a 
religious retreat in the Pocono Mountains.  He was convicted 
on both counts in a jury trial and sentenced to life 
imprisonment without the possibility of parole.   
 Lee filed a petition for habeas corpus against the 
Superintendent of the state prison where he has been 
incarcerated, the District Attorney of Monroe County and the 
Attorney General of Pennsylvania (hereafter collectively 
referred to as “Commonwealth”).  Lee now argues that his 
habeas petition should be granted because he is actually 
innocent.  Specifically, he argues that newly discovered 
evidence proves that the fire expert testimony that the 
Government relied upon to secure his convictions was 
fundamentally unreliable and that therefore his continued 
incarceration violates his due process rights.  In a brief filed 
on behalf of the Commonwealth containing less than three 
pages of substance, the Commonwealth asserts that Lee “has 
merely offered different evidence that could solely be used 
for impeachment purposes,” which “does not, on its own[,] 
establish a constitutional violation.”  Appellee’s Br. at 6.  The 
Commonwealth further argues that Lee’s “claim of actual 
[innocence] without a clear separate constitutional violation is 
not cognizable under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.”  Id. at 7.   
                                              
1 We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 
1291 and 2253(a). 
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I. 
 
Background 
 
A. Convictions and Direct Appeals 
 
  Lee was convicted on September 17, 1990 after an 
eight-day jury trial during which Lee’s attorney had argued 
that Lee’s daughter was mentally ill and had set the fire as a 
suicidal act.  Post-verdict motions were denied and Lee was 
sentenced to life without the possibility of parole.  Lee 
appealed his convictions to the Superior Court of 
Pennsylvania, which remanded to the trial court for an 
evidentiary hearing on Lee’s claims of ineffective assistance 
of counsel.  During that hearing, the court received substantial 
evidence about developments in the field of fire science, 
including testimony from fire expert John J. Lentini.2
 
  This 
evidence provided ample reason to question the reliability of 
the arson investigation.  
Nevertheless, the trial court held that Lee had failed to 
establish that trial counsel was ineffective despite, inter alia, 
trial counsel’s failure to discredit the Commonwealth’s expert 
witnesses or to argue that the fire was accidental.  Lee filed a 
direct appeal in the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, arguing 
that trial counsel was ineffective.  The Superior Court 
affirmed Lee’s convictions and sentence, and the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied allowance of an appeal.   
 
B. Post-Conviction Relief Act (PCRA) 
 
                                              
2 John J. Lentini has undergone extensive training in the 
field of fire investigation.  He has published numerous 
articles on the subject and has provided expert testimony in 
over two hundred cases involving fires.  He has testified in 
both civil and criminal cases for plaintiffs and defendants, 
and he has also served as an expert to advise the court.  The 
Commonwealth does not challenge Lentini’s qualification as 
an expert. 
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 In 1995, Lee filed a pro se petition for relief under the 
PCRA in the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County, 
Pennsylvania.  Inexplicably, the Commonwealth did not 
comply with the court’s order to file a response, and the 
petition sat dormant until the attorney who is now 
representing Lee in this case requested leave to file an 
amended petition in 2001.  Lee’s attorney also requested an 
order granting access to evidence and scientific records that 
were in the possession of the state police.  The District 
Attorney consented to this disclosure, but the PCRA judge 
refused to allow it, stating merely that it was “unduly 
burdensome on the State Police.”  App. at 103. 
 
Lee’s attorney filed an amended petition for relief 
under the PCRA in 2005, which argued that (1) Lee was 
entitled to a new trial because of exculpatory evidence (in the 
form of newly discovered scientific information about fires) 
that was unavailable at the time of trial, and (2) appellate 
counsel was ineffective in the direct appeal by failing to raise 
a claim of after-discovered exculpatory evidence in addition 
to the ineffective assistance claim he had raised.  An affidavit 
from fire expert John J. Lentini explaining developments in 
fire science since the time of Lee’s trial was attached to the 
amended petition.   
 
The Court of Common Pleas held oral argument and 
ultimately denied the petition for PCRA relief.  In affirming 
the denial of Lee’s PCRA petition, the Superior Court of 
Pennsylvania concluded that the Lentini affidavit would be 
“used solely to impeach the Commonwealth’s experts’ 
credibility and to contradict their opinion that the fire was of 
incendiary origin.”  App. at 67.  The court also “reject[ed] 
Lee’s assertion that the Commonwealth’s methodology [for 
arson investigation] was scientifically invalid” because 
Lentini’s affidavit “merely challeng[ed] the varying degrees 
of significance that are attributed to the generally accepted 
components of arson investigation.”  App. at 72-73.  Under 
Pennsylvania law, “[a] new trial may be granted on the theory 
of after discovered evidence only if the new evidence . . . [, 
inter alia,] will not be used solely for impeaching the 
credibility of a witness.”  App. at 66.  This was the reason 
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given by the Superior Court to deny relief on this claim.  The 
Superior Court of Pennsylvania then denied Lee’s application 
for reconsideration or re-argument en banc, and the Supreme 
Court of Pennsylvania denied Lee’s application for allowance 
of appeal.   
 
C. Federal Habeas 
 
   Lee filed a timely petition for writ of habeas corpus 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the District Court for the 
Middle District of Pennsylvania, arguing that (1) appellate 
counsel was ineffective, (2) Lee’s due process rights were 
violated because his convictions were based on inaccurate 
and unreliable evidence, (3) Lee is incarcerated in violation of 
due process because newly developed scientific evidence 
shows that he is probably innocent of the crimes of which he 
was convicted and there is no other substantial evidence of 
guilt, and (4) trial counsel was ineffective.  The District Court 
noted that “[t]he respondent concede[d] that Petitioner has 
exhausted his state court remedies,” App. at 11, and the 
Commonwealth has conceded that Lee raised these federal 
issues in his state court proceedings.  See Appellee’s Br. 8 
(“[A]ll of the appellant’s claims have been heard by the state 
court system.”); see also Albrecht v. Horn, 485 F.3d 103, 124 
(3d Cir. 2007) (“Ultimately, the state post-conviction claim 
was not very different from the federal habeas claim [because 
the] essential factual and legal substance of the 
innocence/unreliable fire science claim was presented at both 
the trial and state Supreme Court levels.”). 
 
 The District Court denied the petition for habeas relief, 
reasoning that “Lee’s claim of newly discovered evidence is 
not cognizable under § 2254 because claims of actual 
innocence based on newly discovered evidence are never 
grounds for federal habeas relief absent an independent 
constitutional violation.”  App. at 15-16 (citations omitted).  
The District Court also concluded that no evidentiary hearing 
was warranted because “Lee’s claims of newly discovered 
evidence were presented to the Pennsylvania Courts in his 
PCRA petition, and affirmed on appeal.”  Id. at 16.  The 
District Court noted the Superior Court’s conclusion that “the 
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after-discovered evidence that would have been used solely 
for impeachment purposes [did] not warrant a new trial under 
Pennsylvania law.”  Id. at 17.  The District Court also denied 
Lee’s ineffective assistance claims.3
 
   
Lee appealed.  The Pennsylvania Innocence Project – a 
non-profit legal clinic housed at Temple University School of 
Law and dedicated to providing pro bono legal and/or 
investigative services to prisoners for whom evidence 
discovered post-conviction can provide conclusive proof of 
innocence – filed an amicus brief in this court, arguing that 
“the federal Constitution provides an avenue through [which] 
the truly innocent may obtain their freedom, notwithstanding 
the lack of any underlying constitutional violations.”  Amicus 
Br. at 2. 
 
II. 
 
Standard of Review 
 
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 
(“AEDPA”) limits the power of a federal court to grant 
habeas relief to a person in custody pursuant to a state court 
judgment.  Federal courts may only entertain habeas petitions 
alleging that the state prisoner is in custody “in violation of 
the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.”  28 
U.S.C. § 2254(a).  When a federal claim has been adjudicated 
on the merits by the state court, the federal court may only 
grant the writ if the state court’s decision as to the federal 
claim was “(1) . . . contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 
application of, clearly established federal law, as determined 
by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) . . . based 
on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 
evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”  Id. § 
2254(d).  If the state court analyzed and rejected a habeas 
petitioner’s federal claims on the merits but gave “no 
                                              
3 Because Lee’s request for a certificate of appealability 
was granted only as to the claims related to his alleged actual 
innocence, we do not address his ineffective assistance 
claims.   
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indication of how it reached its decision,” then the deferential 
standard of review from § 2254 still applies.  See Chadwick v. 
Janecka, 312 F.3d 597, 606 (3d Cir. 2002) (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted).     
 
However, if the state court did not reach the merits of 
the federal claims, then they are reviewed de novo.  See Cone 
v. Bell, 129 S. Ct. 1769, 1784 (2009).  Even in this situation, 
the State court’s relevant factual determinations are presumed 
to be correct unless the petitioner rebuts this presumption by 
clear and convincing evidence.  28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).   
 
It is clear that the state courts in this case relied only 
on state law to deny Lee’s PCRA petition, and there is no 
indication that the state courts analyzed Lee’s federal claims.4
 
  
Accordingly, Lee’s federal claims are subject to de novo 
review. 
III. 
 
Analysis 
 
 Lee argues that his continued incarceration is 
unconstitutional because his convictions are predicated on 
what new scientific evidence has proven to be fundamentally 
                                              
4 The Court of Common Pleas’ Opinion denying Lee’s 
PCRA petition spanned twenty pages and the Superior Court 
of Pennsylvania explained its decision to affirm in a sixteen 
page memorandum, yet neither references a federal due 
process claim.  If the Superior Court of Pennsylvania’s 
decision to “reject Lee’s assertion that the Commonwealth’s 
methodology [underlying the fire expert testimony] was 
scientifically invalid” was a decision on the merits, then it 
was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts 
because the portions of the Lentini affidavit explaining new 
developments in fire science plainly establish the unreliability 
of the methodology used by the experts who testified at Lee’s 
trial.  28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).    
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unreliable expert testimony, in violation of due process.5  To 
succeed, Lee must show that the admission of the fire expert 
testimony “undermined the fundamental fairness of the entire 
trial,” Keller v. Larkins, 251 F.3d 408, 413 (3d Cir. 2001), 
because “the probative value of [the fire expert] evidence, 
though relevant, is greatly outweighed by the prejudice to the 
accused from its admission.”  Bisaccia v. Attorney Gen., 623 
F.2d 307, 313 (3d Cir. 1980) (quoting United States ex rel. 
Bibbs v. Twomey, 506 F.2d 1220, 1223 (7th Cir. 1974)).6  
Before this claim can be adjudicated on the merits, this case 
will be remanded for discovery.7
 
 
Lee asked the District Court to “schedule this case for 
evidentiary hearing, permitting petitioner in preparation for 
such hearing to conduct necessary discovery.”  App. at 57.  
Lee asserts that he is entitled to “whatever physical evidence 
remains” from the fire scene, including “the gas 
                                              
5 Lee also argues that he is entitled to federal habeas relief 
because he is actually innocent.  As explained hereafter, Lee’s 
allegations, if proven, would be sufficient to establish a due 
process violation.  Therefore, we need not decide whether 
Lee’s allegations meet the “extraordinarily high” threshold 
for granting federal habeas relief based on a freestanding 
claim of actual innocence.  Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 
417 (1993).  
 
6 At oral argument, counsel for the Commonwealth agreed 
that this type of claim is cognizable in a federal habeas 
petition:  “If we were at the point where we can say that it’s 
accepted scientifically that not only this is new evidence but it 
clearly . . . disproves the old evidence in saying the old 
evidence is now misleading, then we’re there, then we have a 
due process violation, now we have the actual claim of 
innocence . . . [and] there potentially could be an innocent 
man in jail . . . .”  Oral Arg. at 26:12. 
 
7 As will be explained, the District Court will determine 
whether Lee is entitled to an evidentiary hearing after it has 
granted discovery and reviewed the expanded record.  See 
infra Part III.B.   
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chromatograms, state laboratory reports, and any preserved 
fire debris, as well as the complete file of [the 
Commonwealth’s expert] retired Fire Marshal Thomas 
Jones.”  Appellant’s Br. at 54.  In essence, Lee argues that his 
expert needs the opportunity to independently review the 
evidence from the scene of the fire to fully develop the facts 
underlying Lee’s claim that the expert testimony admitted at 
his trial was fundamentally unreliable.  The District Court 
concluded that no evidentiary hearing was warranted because 
“Lee’s claims of newly discovered evidence were presented 
to the Pennsylvania Courts in his PCRA petition, and 
affirmed on appeal.”  App. at 16.  This appeal requires this 
court to decide whether that decision was an abuse of 
discretion.   
 
A. Discovery 
 
Rule 6 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases states that 
“[a] judge may, for good cause, authorize a party to conduct 
discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 
may limit the extent of discovery.”  “A habeas petitioner may 
satisfy the ‘good cause’ standard by setting forth specific 
factual allegations which, if fully developed, would entitle 
him or her to the writ.”  See Williams v. Beard, 637 F.3d 195, 
209 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 
300 (1969); Lave v. Dretke, 416 F.3d 372, 380 (5th Cir. 
2005)).  “We review the District Court’s denial of a discovery 
request for abuse of discretion.”  Id. at 209 (citations 
omitted).  “A district court abuses its discretion when 
discovery is essential for the habeas petitioner to develop 
fully his underlying claim.”  Id. (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted). 
 
There can be no doubt that Lee has satisfied the good 
cause standard.  Lee specifically alleges that his claim 
“depend[s] on certain facts about scientific developments 
since the time of trial” and that “[t]he PCRA court . . . denied 
the petitioner’s consent motion for production of physical and 
scientific evidence in the Commonwealth’s possession to 
permit his expert to verify and support his analysis.”   
Appellant’s Br. at 53.  He concludes that “[a]ny current 
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deficiency in the record is therefore not attributable to any 
fault of the petitioner . . . .”  Id.  The District Court 
unaccountably did not acknowledge that Lee had requested 
access to this fire scene evidence in the state court and that 
his request was denied, but that fact is shown by the record.   
 
The ability to test the fire scene evidence is crucial 
because, without independent testing, Lee’s expert cannot 
render an independent opinion as to the significance of this 
evidence and instead must rely on other experts’ reports to 
reach his conclusions.  We note that Lentini does not make 
extravagant claims on behalf of Petitioner.  Instead, he was 
particularly cautious in his evaluation, stating 
 
Because of the manner in which this fire was 
investigated, I am unable to render an opinion as to the 
cause of the fire, but I can state unequivocally that all 
of the evidence presented to the Court by the 
Commonwealth’s experts is consistent with an 
accidental fire. 
 
App. at 154 ¶ 30.  See also Appellant’s Br. at 47 (“The only 
reason that [Lentini] could not rule out arson or establish 
accident, it may be presumed, is that the trial judge, when 
presiding over the PCRA proceedings, refused to grant 
petitioner’s unopposed motion for access to the remaining fire 
scene evidence and the contemporaneous scientific test 
results.”).  In fact, the Court of Common Pleas acknowledged 
the impact of failing to give Lee’s expert access to this 
evidence when it noted that “the fact that [Lentini] did not 
have the benefit of investigating the scene or testing any of 
the residue remaining from the events which occurred some 
15 years ago would give little credibility to his conclusions 
before any fact finder.”  App. at 177.  Given that Lee has 
alleged that his expert’s independent analysis will reveal that 
the fire expert testimony at his trial was fundamentally 
unreliable,8
                                              
8 It is worth noting that one of the experts that the 
Commonwealth relied upon at trial—Mr. Jones—responded 
to an article about this fire by writing a letter to the editor, in 
 he has satisfied the good cause standard and the 
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District Court’s denial of his request for discovery was an 
abuse of discretion.9
 
  
B.  Evidentiary Hearing 
 
 In Cullen v. Pinholster, the Supreme Court held that 
“review under § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the record that was 
before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the 
merits.” 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398, 1400 n.4 (2011).10
 
  However, 
this limitation does not apply to federal claims that have not 
been adjudicated on the merits in state-court proceedings, in 
which case § 2254(e)(2) is controlling.  Id. at 1401.  It 
provides: 
If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis 
of a claim in State court proceedings, the court shall 
                                                                                                     
which he stated “Keep in mind that this investigation was 
conducted in 1989 . . . . Some of the indicators found at the 
scene were accepted practice at that time.”  App. at 142 
(citing Fire and Arson Investigator, April 2000, page 5).  This 
statement implicitly acknowledges that some of the indicators 
relied upon at trial are no longer accepted as valid indicators 
of arson, and that his testimony may have been different if the 
new science had been available in 1989.   
  
9 At oral argument, counsel for the Commonwealth 
frankly stated that he does not know if this evidence is still 
available.  In the event that the evidence has been destroyed, 
the District Court will be in the best position to decide 
whether the spoliation inference is appropriate.  See Schmid v. 
Milwaukee Elec. Tool Corp., 13 F.3d 76, 78 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(“Since the early 17th century, courts have admitted evidence 
tending to show that a party destroyed evidence relevant to 
the dispute being litigated . . . [and s]uch evidence permitted 
an inference . . . that the destroyed evidence would have been 
unfavorable to the position of the offending party.”).   
 
10 Our analysis under § 2254(d)(2), see supra note 4, was 
based on the record before the state court.  
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not hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim unless the 
applicant shows that—  
 
(A) the claim relies on— 
 
(i) a new rule of constitutional law, made 
retroactive to cases on collateral review by the 
Supreme Court, that was previously 
unavailable; or  
 
(ii) a factual predicate that could not have been 
previously discovered through the exercise of 
due diligence; and  
 
(B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient 
to establish by clear and convincing evidence that but 
for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would 
have found the applicant guilty of the underlying 
offense.  
 
28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). 
 
Therefore, § 2254(e)(2) bars a federal habeas court 
from holding an evidentiary hearing “unless the petitioner 
was diligent in his attempt to develop a factual basis for his 
claim in the state court proceedings[.]”  Palmer v. Hendricks, 
592 F.3d 386, 392 (3d Cir. 2010).  “Under the opening clause 
of § 2254(e)(2), a failure to develop the factual basis of a 
claim is not established unless there is lack of diligence, or 
some greater fault, attributable to the prisoner or the 
prisoner’s counsel.”  Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 432 
(2000).  Thus, the opening clause of § 2254(e)(2) does not bar 
an evidentiary hearing for a claim that was “pursued with 
diligence but remained undeveloped in state court.”  Id. at 
434. 
 
Here, it is clear that Lee pursued his claim that newly 
developed scientific evidence establishes that the expert 
testimony at his trial was fundamentally unreliable.  He was 
diligent in his efforts to develop this claim in state court by 
filing a motion for access to evidence from the fire scene so 
14 
 
that his expert could perform independent analysis by 
applying the new science to that physical evidence.  When the 
state court denied this motion and the motion for 
reconsideration of that denial, it “depriv[ed] petitioner of a 
further opportunity to investigate.”  Id. at 442.  If his expert 
had access to this evidence, he presumably would have been 
able to render an independent opinion as to whether the fire 
was intentionally set.  Given the Commonwealth’s decision 
not to contest the accuracy of the Lentini affidavit and the 
refusal of the state court to grant discovery, Lee had no 
reason to press his request for an evidentiary hearing any 
further.11  Id. at 435 (“Diligence for purposes of the opening 
clause depends upon whether the prisoner made a reasonable 
attempt, in light of the information available at the time, to 
investigate and pursue claims in state court . . . .”).  Lee’s 
efforts cannot fairly be characterized as exhibiting a lack of 
diligence or greater fault, and his request for an evidentiary 
hearing in federal court is therefore not barred by the opening 
clause of § 2254(e)(2).  See id. at 437 (“[C]omity is not 
served by saying a prisoner ‘has failed to develop the factual 
basis of a claim’ where he was unable to develop his claim in 
state court despite diligent effort.”).12
                                              
11 Lee’s amended PCRA petition contained a conditional 
request for an evidentiary hearing as well as a certification of 
the intended witnesses for such a hearing, as required under 
Pennsylvania state law.  See App. at 109. 
 
 
12 Even if we were to find that Lee had failed to develop 
the factual basis of his claim in state court within the meaning 
of the opening clause of § 2254(e)(2), his case fits within the 
statutory exception to this bar.  Section 2254(e)(2) provides 
that “lack of diligence will not bar an evidentiary hearing if 
efforts to discover the facts would have been in vain, see § 
2254(e)(2)(A)(ii), and there is a convincing claim of 
innocence, see § 2254(e)(2)(B) . . . .”  Id. at 435.  Lee surely 
satisfies this standard.  Lee made efforts to discover the 
relevant facts but his consent motion was denied, as was his 
motion for reconsideration of that decision.  Lee had every 
reason to believe that further efforts to discover these facts 
would have been in vain.  Lee also has a convincing claim of 
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The fact that a federal court is not barred from holding 
an evidentiary hearing on Lee’s federal claim does not 
establish that Lee is entitled to such a hearing.  To make this 
determination, the court must evaluate (i) “whether the 
petition presents a prima facie showing which, if proven, 
would enable the petitioner to prevail on the merits of the 
asserted claim,” and (ii) whether the relevant factual 
allegations to be proven at the evidentiary hearing are 
“contravened by the existing record” or the record “otherwise 
precludes habeas relief[.]”  Palmer, 592 F.3d at 393 (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Schriro v. 
Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007).  We review a District 
Court’s decision to deny an evidentiary hearing for abuse of 
discretion by considering the same two factors.  See Palmer, 
592 F.3d at 393-94 (citations omitted); see also id. at 393 n.3 
(“The Supreme Court has not held, and we do not suggest, 
that a court is precluded from considering additional factors 
in determining the appropriateness of an evidentiary 
hearing.”).   
 
Lee avers that his expert will conclude that there is no 
support for the conclusion that the fire was intentionally set if 
he is given the opportunity to analyze the fire scene evidence 
and apply the principles known through the new 
developments in fire science to that physical evidence.  These 
allegations, if proven, set forth a prima facie case for granting 
Lee habeas relief on his due process claim by showing that 
the admission of the Commonwealth’s fire expert testimony 
undermined the fundamental fairness of Lee’s entire trial 
because the testimony was premised on unreliable science 
and was therefore itself unreliable.  These factual allegations 
                                                                                                     
innocence:  if Lee’s expert’s analysis of the fire scene 
evidence establishes that the fire was not of incendiary origin, 
then that would be clear and convincing evidence that no 
reasonable factfinder would have convicted Lee if not for the 
admission of the fundamentally unreliable expert testimony at 
his trial.  Therefore, Lee’s request for an evidentiary hearing 
in federal court is not barred by § 2254(e)(2). 
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are not contradicted by the existing record,13 not least because 
the Commonwealth has not offered any evidence supporting 
the validity of the old methodology and does not challenge 
the accuracy of the Lentini affidavit, which describes the 
developments in fire science since Lee’s trial and explains 
that many of the scientific theories relied upon by the 
Commonwealth’s experts have been refuted.14
 
  Once Lee is 
granted discovery on remand, the District Court will only 
then be able to determine whether the factual allegations 
underlying Lee’s claims are refuted by the expanded record.   
IV. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 Lee was diligent in his efforts in state court to develop 
his claims that newly developed scientific evidence 
establishes that the expert testimony at his trial was 
fundamentally unreliable, in violation of due process, and that 
Lee is actually innocent.  Additionally, Lee has alleged 
sufficient facts to demonstrate that discovery is essential to 
                                              
13 The record shows that Lee’s pants were covered in 
liquid, but the parties dispute whether that liquid was 
conclusively determined to be accelerant.  Therefore, further 
testing is required to determine whether the presence of this 
liquid constitutes other evidence of guilt.  Cf. Albrecht, 485 
F.3d at 126 (concluding that a habeas petitioner could not 
“exploit the new scientific knowledge [about fires] here” to 
obtain relief “because of ample other evidence of guilt”). 
 
14 Parts of the Lentini affidavit criticize the 
Commonwealth’s fire expert testimony based on information 
that was available at the time of the trial.  We have not 
considered these criticisms in reaching our conclusion that 
Lee’s allegations, if proven, show that the admission of the 
fire expert testimony undermined the fundamental fairness of 
his entire trial.  Rather, our conclusion is based solely on 
Lentini’s explanations of new developments in fire science 
since the time of Lee’s trial. 
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the development of his federal claims.  If Lee’s expert’s 
independent analysis of the fire scene evidence—applying 
principles from new developments in fire science—shows 
that the fire expert testimony at Lee’s trial was fundamentally 
unreliable, then Lee will be entitled to federal habeas relief on 
his due process claim.  Accordingly, because the District 
Court failure to grant Lee’s request for discovery was not in 
the exercise of the Court’s sound discretion, this case will be 
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 
Opinion. 
 
 
 
